It has been argued that when management is more concerned with the firm's survival than with profitability, it is efficient to use a levered capital structure and thereby commit to the transfer of the liquidation decision to lenders. Our paper analyzes this view in a setting where lenders may behave opportunistically when they control the liquidation decision -i.e., when there is a lender holdup problem. We show that in this context, an optimal mix of debt and dividends can mitigate the twin moral hazard problems of the manager and the lender. Given an otherwise optimal capital structure, initiating a dividend policy is shown to increase firm value, lower debt payments, but raise total cash disbursements -interest and dividends -to investors. Numerous other empirical implications of our model are also discussed.
Introduction
It has been argued that when management is more concerned with the firm's survival than with profitability, it is efficient to use a levered capital structure and thereby commit to the transfer of the liquidation decision to lenders [e.g. Harris and Raviv (1990) , Aghion and Bolton (1992) ]. Our paper analyzes this view in a setting where lenders may behave opportunistically when they control the liquidation decision -i.e., when there is a lender holdup problem [e.g. Sharpe (1990) , Rajan (1992) ]. Following a default and consequently being in control of the liquidation decision, the lender may be able to extract significant concessions from the firm's shareholders in negotiations over the continuation of the firm if it is solvent. The prior recognition of this (ex post) moral hazard can adversely affect the firm's earlier real decisions and thereby reduce firm value. We show that under these circumstances, an integrated policy of debt and dividends mitigates both manager and lender moral hazard and therefore increases firm value relative to having solely a debt policy.
As in Harris and Raviv (1990) , debt in our model mitigates the managerial agency problem by providing lenders with information on the firm's profitability. First, the payment of the interest obligation enables lenders to update their expectations concerning the firm's future cash flows while a default alerts lenders of a possible deterioration in the firm's condition and the need for further investigation. 1 In addition, we recognize that dividend payments can serve similar functions.
The payment of the promised dividend provides information to investors of the firm's future cash flows, and an unexpected cut in dividends can also alert investors of a possible deterioration in the firm's profitability and trigger an inspection. While it is possible that such an unexpected cut in a firm's dividend may enhance the value of a lender's claim, the evidence suggests that such a dividend reduction is more generally viewed as implying that the firm's anticipated profitability 1 Of course, this requires that current cash flows are informative of future cash flows, not an unreasonable assumption, and supported by evidence of serial correlation in firm cash flows.
has declined and consequently as being associated with a decrease in the value of the firm's debt. 2 Recognizing the possibly impaired condition of a firm that makes such a dividend announcement, the firm's creditors may wish to inspect further the reasons for the dividend cut and look for any non-compliance with the provisions of their loan agreements. Therefore, while both interest and dividend payments can provide important information to debtholders and serve as a "tripwire," the basic difference is the relative power that lenders have if there is a dividend reduction that results in information of firm deterioration compared to that if the firm fails to pay its debt obligation.
Failure to pay interest on the debt constitutes a default on the loan agreement and generally triggers a contractual condition that makes the entire loan due immediately, and inability to then repay the loan results in control of the firm being transferred to its lenders. 3 In contrast, following a dividend cut, an inspection by the lender that indicates that her claim is jeopardized is not sufficient for the lender to be given control as long as required debt payments have been made. The lender must still establish in court that the firm has violated a condition in the loan agreement in order for the firm to be in (technical) default. The difference between the two "tripwires" relates to the greater difficulty that lenders have in assuming control when the omitted payment is a dividend rather than a debt obligation.
We show that this greater difficulty for lenders to assume control after a dividend cut lowers the expected costs to shareholders from lender holdup and results in the usefulness of a coordinated policy of debt and dividends. Such a policy addresses both the managerial agency problem and the potential holdup by the firm's lenders. In particular, since lenders have greater difficulty to assume control following a dividend cut, the level of total cash disbursements, i.e., interest plus 2 Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2001) , for example, document a deterioration of a firm's credit rating subsequent to an unexpected reduction in its dividend. dividend payments, can be set higher than would be the level of interest payments alone in the absence of a dividend policy. This enables more information to be made available to investors, thereby reducing further the likelihood of the firm being insolvent and the management continuing unprofitable production. The reduction of the lender holdup problem also reduces the distortion in the firm's investment decisions and thereby increases firm value. 4
Our study is part of an extensive literature that examines various ways in which committing to cash outflows -debt and dividends -provides managerial discipline. Grossman and Hart (1982) provide an early analysis in this literature, with debt imposing the risk of financial distress and of personal bankruptcy costs upon insiders. Given this possible outcome associated with debt, insiders' use of financial leverage is viewed as a commitment that they will engage in valuemaximizing behavior. Jensen (1986) emphasizes that both dividends and debt payments remove cash that otherwise might be spent on activities that would not enhance firm value but that would instead provide insiders with private benefits. Likewise, Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) point out that a commitment to paying dividends and/or to financial leverage results in a relatively greater periodic need for external capital -this in turn mitigates incentive conflicts by forcing the disclosure of relevant information as part of the process of issuing securities. Chang (1993) provides an interesting study of coordinated debt and dividend policies in an agency context -the only such study that we are aware. In this work, managers consume the difference between firms' optimal and actual payouts; linking compensation to firms' payout policies -debt and dividends -mitigates this managerial agency problem. Finally, it has been recognized, for examples in Berlin and Loeys (1988) , Besanko and Kanatas (1993) , and Rajan and Winton (1995) , that debt comes with covenants and monitoring that provide a degree of protection not only for the lenders but also for outside shareholders against opportunistic behavior by insiders. The basic model is described next. The role of debt is examined in section 3. A coordinated policy of debt and dividends is analyzed in section 4 where we also discuss the model's empirical implications. Section 5 concludes.
The Model Setup
A firm has a single ex ante positive NPV project that can last for three dates -t = 0, 1, 2 -and requires N > 0 dollars of financing at t = 0. If it is funded, the project will produce an initially uncertain cash flow x ∈ [0, ∞) at t = 1, and if it is continued, another uncertain cash flow at t = 2. Letting h(x) denote the ex ante probability density function (p.d.f.) of x, and H(x) the probability distribution, we assume that the hazard rate, h(x)/[1 − H(x)] is non-increasing in x. Given our focus, we assume that once the firm's initial financing policy is in place, the firm is controlled by a manager (insider) who holds a small proportion α ∈ (0, 1/2) of its shares. 5 The rest, 1 − α proportion, of its shares is diffusely held by outside investors. We assume that neither the firm nor its manager has any funds available to finance the project, thereby making external financing necessary.
The incentive conflict of the manager originates from his preference for continuing the project at t = 1 even if it is in the interests of the firm's outside shareholders to liquidate it. As in Harris and Raviv (1990) and Aghion and Bolton (1992) , the manager prefers firm survival to profitability, presumably because he enjoys private (non-pecuniary) benefits associated with his being in control of the firm's operations, where these benefits exceed his possible gains from the firm's liquidation. 6 Note that such preferences would also make infeasible the use of a compensation contract to align the manager's interests with those of outside shareholders. We assume that the project's liquidation 5 As in Aghion and Bolton (1992) , a firm's financial policy could alternatively be viewed as a managerial commitment.
6 In Kanatas and Qi (2001) , we model a similar managerial incentive problem but in a different setting.
value is Q > 0 at t = 1, but zero at t = 2. Thus, if the manager acted in the interests of outside shareholders, he would liquidate the project at t = 1 if the expected value from its continuation is less than the liquidation value Q. The manager, however, prefers to continue the project, regardless of the expected payoff. Given this incentive, the manager would generally prefer a funding contract that would ensure his subsequent control of the project's liquidation/continuation decision.
If the manager's incentive problem is to be addressed in our model, the firm's outside shareholders (or their representatives) must be able to affect its initial financing decision. Perhaps the simplest way to understand this is to view the board of directors as recognizing management's incentive conflict and hence selecting a financing contract at t = 0 that can discipline management and maximize the expected (monetary) payoff -the "firm value" -to the shareholders. We envision that at t = 0 the board hires a manager to run the firm's project, possibly because the board itself lacks information and expertise to do so. However, recognizing that the manager's interests need not be aligned with those of shareholders, the task of the board is to put in place incentive compensation and financing mechanisms that will deal with the agency conflict. In our model, the nature of management preferences precludes incentive compensation as an effective mechanism for dealing with the agency problem and our focus is on the extent to which debt policy (and later in conjunction with dividends) may do so. Debt financing imposes discipline on management because the lender is empowered to assume control of the firm (by forcing bankruptcy) if the firm is shown to have failed to honor its pre-specified obligations by failing to make a scheduled debt payment or by violating debt covenants.
We assume an information asymmetry between the firm's insider and its outside investors. In particular, the project's realized interim cash flow x is observed only by the insider -whoever is in control at t = 1; outsiders learn only interim cash payments -either debt or dividends, or both -made by the firm to its investors. As will be seen, these interim cash payments enable lenders to make an inference about x and hence the firm's financial condition. This latter link arises from our assumption that if the project is continued, its t = 2 cash flow is a function of its earlier cash flow x and two additional factors. One such factor concerns the economic viability of the project's continuation -information emerges at t = 1 on the general profitability of this type of venture -which is denoted by a random variable θ ∈ {0, 1}, with the uncertainty resolved at t = 1. If θ = 0, the project will not be profitable at t = 2; in this case, if it is continued, its t = 2 cash flow will be zero. If θ = 1, however, the project's t = 2 cash flow, if it is continued, will depend also on the other factor -an initial investment of "effort" by the manager (to be specified). The realized θ = 0 or 1 is only privately observed by the firm's insider at t = 1. However, if investors were to learn the interim cash flow x, it would provide information on the viability, θ, of the project, given by a pair of conditional probabilities: Pr(θ = 1|x) and Pr(θ = 0|x), with Pr(θ = 1|x) increasing and Pr(θ = 0|x) decreasing in x. 7
As mentioned, the project's eventual payoff at t = 2 depends also on the manager's t = 0 exertion of effort, e ∈ [0, ∞). We assume that this effort choice is private information to the manager and costs him a monetary equivalent of c(e). The effort choice is a simple and widely used approach to capture potential adverse effects of the insider's incentive conflict on the firm's real investment decisions, and for our purpose, the simplest is to assume that the manager's effort affects the "quality" -the probability of a high return -of the project. In particular, given the manager's effort e at t = 0 and the cash flow x at t = 1, the project's t = 2 payoff, if it is continued, will be θk(x) with probability p(e) and zero with probability 1 − p(e). Thus, if the project is economically viable -i.e., θ = 1 -then the manager's effort affects its t = 2 expected payoff, with greater effort resulting in a greater likelihood of the high payoff. Throughout, we assume that the function k(.) is increasing, p(.) is increasing and concave, c(.) is increasing and convex, and all satisfy regularity conditions that are needed to ensure interior solutions.
7 Here, we are implicitly assuming that random variables x and θ have a prior joint distribution that gives rise to the conditional probabilities. For simplicity, we describe only the property of the conditional probabilities but not the joint distribution.
3 The Role of Debt
Manager in Control
To address the manager's incentive to continue the project even when its early liquidation would be preferred by (outside) shareholders, the firm's creditors must be able to assume control if the firm is unable to meet a contractual interest payment. For now, there is no dividend policy. Specifically, suppose that a lender provides credit of L 0 ≥ 0 to the firm at t = 0, and in return, the firm agrees to repay the lender b 1 ≥ 0 at t = 1 and b 2 ≥ 0 at t = 2. If the firm honors its interim obligation b 1 , the manager will retain control, and given his preferences, will certainly continue the project.
Thus, the manager will want to make this payment b 1 if he is able to do so, i.e., if x ≥ b 1 . In this situation, given effort e and cash flow x, the lender's expected t=2 payoff is
We use the superscript "m" to denote the manager being in control. Then the expected payoff to the firm's shareholders and the firm value are, respectively,
Lender in Control
When the firm's interim cash flow is less than the required payment, i.e., x < b 1 , the firm will be unable to honor its debt obligation b 1 at t = 1 and will have to transfer control to the lender.
Becoming an insider, the lender will now learn the realized cash flow x and profitability factor θ. 8
A key feature in our model is the lender's incentive to behave opportunistically subsequent to her gaining control. In this situation, if the lender continues the project, we assume that she will be able to extract a proportion β ∈ (0, 1] of the equity claim on the t = 2 payoff in addition to maintaining her original debt claim. If the project is liquidated, however, the lender will maintain only her debt claim. This latter assumption is actually immaterial; as will be seen, when the project is liquidated, its liquidation value will be insufficient to satisfy the firm's debt obligation b 2 at t = 2. While we take this transfer payment to the lender as exogenous and as an equity stake in order to simplify the analysis, it can evidently be derived as an outcome of a Nash bargaining game and expressed as a renegotiated loan rate. Taking β as an exogenous parameter that measures the severity of the lender holdup problem facilitates the development of testable implications relating it to features of the debt and dividend policies.
We now consider the lender's liquidation decision when she is in control at t = 1, i.e., when
x < b 1 . Upon learning the realized x and θ, and given a conjectured equilibrium effort e, the lender's payoff if she chooses project liquidation over continuation is
If instead she chooses to continue the project, her expected payoff is
Thus, the lender prefers the project's liquidation to continuation if and only if
, e) and the lender will prefer liquidation. But, if θ = 1, the lender may choose liquidation or continuation even when it is efficient (in terms of maximizing the firm value) to do otherwise. An efficient liquidation decision is to terminate the project at t = 1 if and only if the project's liquidation value is greater than the expected payoff from its continuation, i.e., Q > θp(e)k(x). We establish below a condition that ensures that the lender's continuation/liquidation decision is efficient (ex post).
Proposition 1 When x < b 1 and the lender is in control, her continuation/liquidation decision at
Given efficient liquidation by the lender when x < b 1 , the payoffs to the lender and to the shareholders, and the firm value, are now
Comparing V l (x, e) above with V m (x, e) earlier, we see that lender control increases firm value by preserving the project's liquidation value when its continuation is no longer productive.
Optimal Debt Policy
In order to derive the optimal debt policy (without dividends), we examine the manager's effort choice at t = 0, recognizing the lender's incentive to extract concessions in loan renegotiations.
Recall that the manager initially owns a proportion α of the firm's shares. If the interim cash flow is x < b 1 , the lender will gain control and the manager's payoff from his shareholdings will be αS l (x, e). But, if x ≥ b 1 , the manager will retain control and his payoff from his equity stake will be αS m (x, e). Thus, the manager at t = 0 chooses effort e ∈ [0, ∞) to maximize
It is important to note that the manager's effort is privately chosen after the terms of debt financing, b 1 and b 2 , have already been set. Consequently, while the manager would want to make a commitment to exert a higher level of effort in order to increase the probability of his remaining in control, such a commitment would not be credible a priori. Once the debt terms, b 1 and b 2 , have been determined, the probability of the manager remaining in control is independent of his subsequent choice of effort. Here, we need an additional assumption that the manager's control rents are lost once the firm defaults on its debt obligation and the lender takes over the liquidation/continuation decision. 9 Therefore, the manager's (time-consistent) effort choice maximizes his payoffs from shareholdings -the above objective function. The first-order condition characterizes the optimal e as a function of parameters α and β and the firm's debt obligations b 1 and b 2 .
Proposition 2 Suppose k(b 1 ) > b 2 . Then, all else the same, the manager's effort e is increasing in his ownership α, decreasing in the severity β of the lender holdup problem, and decreasing in both debt payments b 1 and b 2 .
The above results are intuitive. A higher α implies a greater ownership by the manager and therefore greater effort. A larger value of β, b 1 , or b 2 , on the other hand, implies a greater payoff to the lender if she is in control of the project's liquidation decision; accordingly, the manager's effort will be lower.
The firm's optimal debt policy is to choose the amount of debt financing at t = 0, L 0 , and the repayments, b 1 and b 2 , to maximize the expected (monetary) payoff to its shareholders, subject to incentive compatibility conditions; that is,
e ∈ argmax α
Recall that N is the project's funding needs. Expression (1) is shareholders' expected project profit.
Equation (2) guarantees that the firm's debt issue is fairly priced. Condition (3) ensures optimal 9 Although the manager could conceivably be hired by the lender to run the project if it is continued, the manager would certainly be under greater scrutiny by the lender and therefore would be less likely to enjoy control rents. managerial effort. Condition (4) ensures efficient project liquidation by the lender when in control.
By substituting (2) into (1), the objective function becomes
Therefore, the shareholders' problem is equivalently to choose L 0 , b 1 , and b 2 to maximize the firm value (6), subject to constraints (3), (4), and (5).
The first-order conditions characterize optimal debt payments, b 1 and b 2 , as functions of parameters α, β, and Q. For tractability, we specify p(e) = e/(e + τ ) for some τ > 0. This function satisfies regularity conditions, including p (e) > 0 and p (e) < 0. Furthermore, we consider the case having a sufficiently small parameter τ , which simplifies the analysis by allowing us to ignore the secondary (less important) effects of cross partials. We observe in our subsequent numerical analysis, however, that these results can be obtained for a wide range of value of τ .
Proposition 3 For a sufficiently small τ , the optimal debt payment b 1 is increasing in the manager's ownership α but decreasing in the severity β of the holdup problem; the final debt payment b 2 is decreasing in both α and β; and both debt payments are increasing in the liquidation value Q.
Proposition 3 is intuitive. A greater ownership stake by the manager -i.e., a higher α -motivates greater effort. Therefore, the disincentive effect of a higher b 1 on the manager's effort is weaker at a higher level of α, and optimal b 1 is increasing in α. Similarly, a higher liquidation value, Q, implies a greater benefit of lender control; this occurs when x < b 1 and thus b 1 is also increasing in Q. In contrast, the optimal final payment b 2 is constrained by (4). Thus, b 2 is increasing in Q, but decreasing in α since a higher ownership by the manager results in greater effort. Likewise, a more severe lender holdup problem -i.e., a higher β -results in lower effort, thereby making lender control more costly. Thus, b 1 is decreasing in β, while the constraint of (4) implies that b 2 is increasing in β.
Debt and Dividends

The Informational Role of Dividends
While debt financing mitigates the managerial agency problem by ensuring an ex post efficient liquidation decision when the lender is in control, the lender's incentive to extract concessions from shareholders in a renegotiation of the loan agreement imposes a cost on the firm by motivating the manager to reduce his prior effort ("real investment"). In this section, we show how a dividend policy in addition to debt may help alleviate the lender holdup problem. A combination of debt and dividend payments provides improved information on the firm's current cash flows. In addition, a cut in the dividend may trigger lender investigation which in turn may lead to lender control.
Specifically, the lender may follow a dividend reduction by initiating a (costly) examination of the firm -i.e., an investigation of possible violations of debt covenants. If lender inspection uncovers such a violation -one that is established in court -then the firm will be in technical default of its loan agreement and the entire loan will be due immediately, as in a default on debt payments.
The inability to repay the loan immediately will then cause a transfer of control of the firm to the lender. Clearly, however, it is much easier for the lender to assume control following a default on debt payments; that is our point. In the case of a dividend cut that alerts the lender of possible impairment of the firm, the burden of proof on the lender is much greater than if a debt payment is omitted. If the suspicion of impairment is verified and loan covenants have indeed been violated, the lender must then petition the court for control, which may or may not be granted.
To examine this informational role of dividends, we assume that the lender can incur an investigation cost, I > 0, at t = 1 to unearth an indicator, ξ ∈ {0, 1}, about the firm's financial health. The indicator ξ relates to the viability factor θ, and for simplicity, we assume that they are perfectly, positively correlated. Thus, a relevant loan covenant is to require that the firm maintain its financial health at the high level ξ = 1. Of course, such a restriction is enforceable only if the indicator ξ, once unearthed by the lender, is potentially verifiable in court. We assume that if the lender carries out the costly investigation and subsequently uncovers ξ = 0, then with probability π ∈ (0, 1), she will be able to successfully establish in court that the firm has indeed failed to maintain the high level ξ = 1. If the lender does not investigate or if her investigation uncovers ξ = 1, however, her probability of success in court will be zero -presumably, it is much more difficult for the lender to build a credible case based on little or no information, or on outright false information.
As before, we start with the firm borrowing L 0 at t = 0 and agreeing to pay the lender b 1 at t = 1 and b 2 at t = 2. Now, the firm also promises to pay its shareholders a dividend of d 1 ≥ 0 at t = 1. Given these commitments, if the firm's interim cash flow is x < b 1 , it will be unable to honor its debt obligation b 1 . In this case, the lender will take over control and no dividend will be paid.
Denoting byL l (x, e) andŜ l (x, e) the payoffs now to the firm's lender and to its shareholders, these payoffs are the same as those before, i.e.,L l (x, e) = L l (x, e) andŜ l (x, e) = S l (x, e). Accordingly, the firm value, nowV l (x, e), is also the same, i.e.,V l (x, e) = V l (x, e).
Also analogous is when the firm's cash flow is x ≥ b 1 + d 1 at t = 1, in which case the manager will be able to honor both debt obligation b 1 and dividend d 1 . Now, if the lender chooses not to investigate the firm (as will be assured), the manager will retain control and the project will be continued. The payoffs to the firm's lender and shareholders arê
Thus, with the manager in control, the firm value is also the same as that without the dividend, i.e.,V m (x, e) = V m (x, e).
If the firm's interim cash flow x is intermediate, i.e., b 1 ≤ x < b 1 + d 1 , the firm can meet its debt obligation b 1 but not the dividend d 1 at t = 1. Consequently, it has to cut its dividend to x − b 1 < d 1 . 10 Upon observing a dividend cut, suppose that the lender chooses to investigate the firm's financial health indicator ξ (as will be confirmed). Then, if she uncovers ξ = 0 (and hence θ = 0), she will petition the court for control in order to prevent the continuation of the zero-payoff project. With probability π, the lender will succeed in this attempt and the project will be liquidated. If her investigation reveals ξ = 1, however, the lender will not petition for control, given the low (zero) probability of success, and the manager in control will continue the project. Therefore, given b 1 ≤ x < b 1 + d 1 , the lender's expected payoff if she investigates iŝ
with the superscript "i" denoting lender investigation. Condition (4) implies min{Q, b 2 } = Q.
Thus, the payoff to the firm's shareholders and the firm value are noŵ
Incorporating dividends reduces the distortion the anticipated lender holdup has on the manager's effort. However, the dividend policy also introduces (more costly) investigation, with cost I, and reduces the expected payoff from liquidation to πQ when θ = 0.
We now establish a condition to ensure that the lender will investigate the firm for a possible loan agreement violation if and only if the firm's dividend payment is less than d 1 . In such a situation, if the lender did not investigate, the manager would maintain control, and given cash flow x, profitability factor θ, and a conjectured managerial effort e, the lender's payoff would bẽ
Thus, the lender will investigate if and only ifL i (x, e) >L m (x, e), i.e., Pr(θ = 0|x)πQ − I > 0. The 10 The assumption that the remainder of cash is paid out as dividends is unimportant, although it does simplify our analysis.
condition to ensure this when
This is because Pr(θ = 0|x) is decreasing in x; thus, Pr(θ = 0|x)πQ
Optimal Debt and Dividends
We again turn to the manager's choice of effort at t = 0. Analogous to the earlier analysis, the manager chooses effort e to maximize
Likewise, we have results on optimal effort that are similar to those of Proposition 1.
Proposition 4 Suppose k(b 1 ) > b 2 . Then, all else the same, the manager's effort e is increasing in his ownership α, decreasing in the severity β of the lender holdup problem, decreasing in both debt payments b 1 and b 2 , and decreasing in the dividend d 1 .
Intuitively, a greater ownership α by the manager, all else the same, motivates greater effort.
A higher β, b 1 , b 2 , and d 1 , however, implies a greater payoff to the lender when she is in control, thereby motivating lower effort by the manager.
We now determine the firm's optimal debt and dividend policy as characterized by the choice of initial debt L 0 , repayments b 1 and b 2 , and dividend d 1 ; thus, the firm's choice problem is now
p(e)b 2 ≥ Q,
With the exception of condition (7) -needed to ensure that the lender will investigate the firm if and only if the firm makes its interim debt payment b 1 but cuts its dividend below the promised d 1 -the above setup is analogous to that without dividends. As before, we specify p(e) = e/(e + τ ) for some τ > 0.
Proposition 5 For a sufficiently small τ , the optimal interim debt payment b 1 is increasing in α, Q, and I, and decreasing in β and π; the optimal dividend d 1 is decreasing in α and I, increasing in β and π, and also increasing in Q if π is sufficiently close to 1; the optimal final debt payment b 2 is decreasing in α, and increasing in β and Q.
As before, a greater ownership claim by the manager, i.e., a greater α, motivates greater effort.
Therefore, the disincentive effect of a higher interest payment b 1 on the manager's choice of effort is smaller for a larger value of α. Hence, b 1 is increasing in α and d 1 is decreasing in it because d 1 is a substitute for b 1 . A higher liquidation value Q increases the benefit of lender control, which occurs either when x < b 1 or b 1 ≤ x < b 1 + d 1 ; thus both optimal b 1 and d 1 increase with Q. And the final debt payment b 2 is increasing in Q because a higher Q relaxes the constraint on b 2 imposed by condition (4). The same constraint, however, also implies that b 2 is decreasing in α since a higher α results in greater effort e. In contrast, a more severe lender holdup problem, i.e., a higher β, results in lower managerial effort, thereby making the lender's control more costly. Thus, b 1 is decreasing while d 1 is increasing in β, and the constraint of (4) implies that b 2 is also increasing in β. Finally, a higher I depicts an increased lender investigation cost while a lower π indicates that it is less likely that the results of such an inspection can be established in court; therefore, the debt payment b 1 is increasing in I and decreasing in π, while the dividend d 1 is decreasing in I and increasing in π.
Numerical Example and Empirical Implications
Our model is sufficiently complex that additional closed form results are not possible. We now introduce a numerical example to examine additional important implications. As mentioned earlier, the numerical analysis also confirms our analytical results for a wide range of value of parameter τ . We consider a simple p.d.f. of h(x) = 1 for x ∈ [0, 1] and h(x) = 0 otherwise. We assume k(x) = Kx and Pr(θ = 1|x) = x, and we take p(e) = e/(e + 0.2) for τ = 0.2 and c(e) = 0.2e(e + 0.4) e + 0.2 + 0.08 ln 0.2 e + 0.2 .
These functions satisfy regularity conditions and have c (e)/p (e) = e 2 -which makes the numerical analysis considerably simpler.
We first compare the results with a policy of debt and dividends to those with debt alone, using parameters K = 10, α = 0.1, β = 0.8, Q = 1, I = 0.2, and π = 0.8. The results are presented below, where we use the notation (−) to indicate a reduction or (+) an increase in the value of that variable as a consequence of adding a dividend policy to that of debt alone.
Variable Change after Adding Dividend
Managerial effort at t = 0, e
Firm value at t = 0, V 0 (+)
With the introduction of a dividend policy, our numerical results above show that both managerial effort and firm value increase. The use of debt, in general, is reduced -both the leverage ratio, L 0 /V 0 , and the debt service ratio, b 1 /E[x], decrease, although the total interim cash payout
, is greater. This reduction in the use of debt diminishes the chance that the firm, despite having a relatively high current cash flow, may become insolvent. Most importantly, the dividend policy improves the manager's incentive to apply effort e and therefore leads to a greater firm value V 0 .
The numerical analysis derives additional comparative static results that are also testable and that relate important variables to model parameters -managerial ownership α, the severity β of the lender holdup problem, firm liquidation value Q, and the firm's terminal payoff K. Below, we
show the effects -increase is (+) while decrease is (−) -of an increase in our model parameters on the selected variables.
Prob. of default on t = 1 debt payment (+) (−) (+) (−)
Prob. of inspection after dividend cut (−) (+) (+) (+)
Intuitively, increases in managerial ownership, α, motivate greater effort and thereby improve firm value, V 0 . Since a higher α increases both the use of debt and firm value, its effect on the debt ratio is ambiguous. Also, greater effort makes the effect of higher interim debt payments on the manager's disincentive for effort less costly and therefore the debt service ratio is increasing while the dividend payout ratio is decreasing in α. Dividend yield falls with α because the equity value rises with α by more than the optimal reduction in the dividend. Increases in α increase b 1 and consequently raise the probability of default on interim debt payments. On the other hand, a higher α reduces the dividend d 1 and thereby reduces the probability of lender inspection after a dividend cut.
Likewise, an increase in the severity of lender holdup, β, reduces both firm value and the optimal use of debt, and consequently, both the debt ratio and the interim debt payment decrease.
As lender holdup becomes more severe, the substitution of dividends for interim debt payments becomes more attractive, thereby increasing the dividend payout ratio. The reduction in equity value from lender holdup together with the increase in dividends increases dividend yields. While the reduction in the use of debt and in the interim debt payments reduces the likelihood of default, the increase in the dividend raises the probability that lenders will inspect upon a dividend cut.
Concerning the liquidation value, a higher Q results in a greater (initial) firm value V 0 and also supports more debt financing. The latter effect of a higher Q dominates the former, and therefore, the debt ratio rises. With a greater liquidation value, the payoff to default is higher, thereby increasing both debt service and dividend payout ratios. Equity value rises, but not as much as the dividend, resulting in an increase in the dividend yield. And with the increase in both interim debt and dividend payments, the probabilities of default on interim debt payment and of lender inspection following a dividend cut both rise.
With respect to the terminal payoff K for a given x, firm value V 0 obviously rises with an increase in K. Also, with a greater K, the manager's suboptimal continuation of the project is less costly, thereby reducing the need for debt financing and for the interim debt payment; thus, the debt and debt service ratios both fall. In contrast, the dividend payout ratio rises because dividends are a substitute for interim debt payments, and the lender's inspection after a dividend cut does not affect the project's continuation as long as the project is viable (θ = 1). The equity value increases in K, and this effect dominates that of increasing the dividend payout ratio, making the dividend yield decreasing in K. Finally, the decrease in the interim debt payment and the increase in the dividend from a higher K result in a lower probability of default on the debt payment and greater probability that lenders will inspect the firm if the dividend is cut.
Conclusion
An important idea in the literature is that it is efficient to transfer the liquidation decision to a firm's lenders when its insiders enjoy control rents that motivate their continuation of unprofitable operations. In this context, our analysis recognizes that lenders may behave opportunistically when in control of the firm. While the disposition of the firm may still be efficient, the lender's moral hazard distorts the firm's prior real decisions. We show that one way to address this managerial moral hazard and opportunistic lender behavior is with a coordinated policy of debt and dividends. Both debt and dividends are informative in our model, and such a coordinated policy helps lenders contain the manager's incentive conflict at a lower cost than that with debt alone. As with debt payments, dividends help generate information for lenders that can be used to make assessments of the firm's future cash flows; failure to pay the dividend provides additional information that may be used to determine whether further inspection of the firm is needed to ascertain possible loan covenant violations. This view is consistent with evidence that firms' performance generally deteriorates following a dividend cut. However, unlike the significant power lenders have after a default on debt payments, it is much more difficult for lenders to gain control following an unexpected dividend reduction that is associated with firm deterioration. Therefore, while dividends are informative, lender holdup is less likely after a dividend cut as compared to a default on debt. This lower expected cost of lender moral hazard from dividends compared to debt motivates the design of an integrated policy of debt and dividends.
While our analysis has dealt only with the information that is provided to lenders by debt and dividend payments, we do not mean to suggest that this is the most important explanation for such payments. However, we do view as compelling the idea that there is information content in the continued payments or suspensions of committed cash flows. Lenders can economize on information costs by foregoing continuous monitoring of the firm and instead installing such "tripwires" as dividends and debt payments and monitoring only when these payments are omitted.
Proof of Proposition 1. If θ = 0, the lender will choose liquidation at t = 1. Thus, we focus on
efficient to liquidate the project at t = 1 and the lender will do so because
Conversely, if p(e)k(x) ≥ Q, it is efficient to continue and the lender will also do so because
Therefore, the condition, p(e)(b 1 + b 2 − x) ≥ Q, ensures that the controlling lender's liquidation/continuation decision is efficient at t = 1. 2
Proof of Proposition 2. If x < b 1 , the lender will be in control. Let
If x ≥ b 1 , the manager will be in control. Then, if b 1 ≤ x < b 1 + b 2 , the manager's payoff is
Thus, the manager chooses effort e to maximize
The first-order condition has
Let ψ(e) = c (e)/p (e); ψ(e) > 0 and ψ (e) > 0. Therefore, the comparative statics are e α = ∂e/∂α = ψ(e)/(αψ (e)) > 0,
(1 − β)
. Then the Lagrangian of the firm's maximization problem is
where e is the manager's optimal effort, i.e., that solves constraint (3), and µ is the multiplier for constraint (4). The first-order conditions have
where F j , j ∈ {1, 2}, denotes the partial derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to variable b j .
Note that constraint (4) must be binding; for otherwise, µ = 0 and F 2 < 0, implying b 2 = 0 and a violation of the same constraint. Thus,
implying p (e)e 2 b 2 + p(e) > 0. For expositional convenience, we writê
e jn ≡ ∂ 2 e/(∂b j ∂b n ), and F jn ≡ ∂F j /∂b n . By taking the partial derivatives of the first-order conditions, 
and F µµ = 0. By specifying p(e) = e/(e + τ ), p (e) = τ /(e + τ ) 2 > 0, and p (e) = −2τ /(e + τ ) 3 < 0.
Then, as τ → 0,Ẑ →K and µ → −τ e 2K /e 2 , and 
where the limiting case again follows from substituting p(e) = e/(e + τ ) and taking τ → 0. By
Cramer's rule,
The above H 3 is the bordered hessian matrix and its determinant is positive by the second order conditions of the maximization problem, i.e.,
We can likewise establish the comparative statics results for parameters β and Q. The details of this derivation is omitted to avoid repetition. 2
Proof of Proposition 4. This proof is analogous to that of Proposition 2. Now, the manager chooses effort e to maximize
Again, let ψ(e) = c (e)/p (e). Now, e α = ∂e/∂α = ψ(e)/(αψ (e)) > 0, < 0, whereẐ is identical to that given earlier except that λ 1 now replaces µ.
By taking the partial derivatives of the first-order conditions, and again, by substituting p(e) = e/(e + τ ) and for τ → 0, Finally, the comparative statics results for parameters β, Q, π, and I can be similarly established.
The details of this derivation is also omitted to avoid repetition. 2
